| 2020 Q1 Migration/Roy model | a | 迁移决策的线性近似 | 从 migrate iff exp(w1)-C > exp(w0) 出发,用小迁移成本近似得到 (μ1−μ0−π)+(ε1−ε0)>0 | Autumn Topic 3, p56-63 | |
| 2020 Q1 Migration/Roy model | b | migration probability | 定义 ν=ε1−ε0,标准化成 z,用 normal CDF 写迁移概率 | Autumn Topic 3, p60-66 | |
| 2020 Q1 Migration/Roy model | c | migrants 的 counterfactual home earnings | 用 truncated normal/IMR 计算 E[w0∣I=1],强调 selection term | Autumn Topic 3, p64-68 | |
| 2020 Q1 Migration/Roy model | d | 模型假设评价 | 逐条评估 earnings normality, known parameters, no nonpecuniary motives, proportional migration cost, no credit/friction | Autumn Topic 3, p47-75 | |
| 2020 Q2 RD school grant | a | parametric RD specification | 写 Yi=α+β(xi−x0)+ρDi+ηi,并说明 running variable, cutoff, bandwidth, treatment definition | Autumn Topic 2, p74-85 | |
| 2020 Q2 RD school grant | b | fewer parametric assumptions | 用 local linear/nonparametric RD;说明 bandwidth 选择和 local nature | Autumn Topic 2, p86-88 | |
| 2020 Q2 RD school grant | c | other policy at same threshold | 检查其它政策或 predetermined outcomes/covariates 是否在 cutoff 同时跳跃 | Autumn Topic 2, p91-95; Autumn Topic 2, p108 | |
| 2020 Q2 RD school grant | d | headteacher changes after policy | 区分 post-treatment mediator 和 manipulation;若 assignment 用 census pre-policy headteacher status,不一定 invalid,但解释变成 reduced form | Autumn Topic 2, p91-101 | |
| 2020 Q2 RD school grant | e | manipulation concerns | 检查 running variable density bunching, covariate balance, sorting around cutoff | Autumn Topic 2, p91-95; Autumn Topic 2, p123-124 | |
| 2020 Q3 Crime and incentives | a | Becker crime model and legal wages | 用 opportunity cost 写 legal wage 上升降低 crime participation;解释 table wage coefficient sign | 未在当前 lecture PDFs 中找到 Becker crime 对应页 | |
| 2020 Q3 Crime and incentives | b | conviction rate and deterrence | conviction probability raises expected cost of crime;看 coefficient 是否与 deterrence prediction 一致 | 未在当前 lecture PDFs 中找到 Becker crime 对应页 | |
| 2020 Q3 Crime and incentives | c | conviction rate endogeneity | crime rates may affect policing/conviction, omitted enforcement shocks, reverse causality | 未在当前 lecture PDFs 中找到 Becker crime 对应页 | |
| 2020 Q3 Crime and incentives | d | sentence length as IV | 写 relevance and exclusion;比较 OLS/IV 可解释 measurement error or endogeneity direction | 未在当前 lecture PDFs 中找到 Becker crime/IV 应用页;IV 基础见 Autumn Topic 1, p124-149 | |
| 2020 Q3 Crime and incentives | e | minimum wage as IV for low wage | 评估 relevance 和 exclusion;最低工资可能通过 employment margin 直接影响 crime,需用 MW theory/evidence 平衡讨论 | Lecture 6, p21-34; Lecture 6, p50-104 | |
| 2020 Q4 Becker-Tomes IGM | a | OLS 不识别 structural beta | 写 unobserved endowment correlated with parental income,OLS mixes parental investment and inherited endowment | Lecture 8, p15-25; Lecture 8, p37-52 | |
| 2020 Q4 Becker-Tomes IGM | b | identical twins | 用 twins 控制 genetic endowment;说明需要 identical endowment and comparable family treatment | Lecture 8, p78-88 | |
| 2020 Q4 Becker-Tomes IGM | c | adoptees | 用 adoptive parent income variation;需要 random assignment/no selective placement | Lecture 8, p93-108 | |
| 2020 Q4 Becker-Tomes IGM | d | adoption estimates interpretation | 分 biological parent effect 和 adoptive parent effect,解释 nature vs nurture/environment | Lecture 8, p93-99 | |
| 2020 Q4 Becker-Tomes IGM | e | China shock and upward mobility | 把 local trade shock 连到 parental income, school/neighborhood, job displacement scarring and local opportunity | Lecture 8, p117-123; Lecture 4 Update, p7-13; Lecture 9, p55-59 | |
| 2021 Q1 Divorce and income | a | simultaneous causal signs | 判断 income affects divorce and divorce affects income 的符号,并说明机制 | Autumn Topic 1, p100-123; Autumn Topic 4, p42-45 | |
| 2021 Q1 Divorce and income | b | OLS in simultaneous equations | 代入联立方程,写 OLS estimand as structural effect plus simultaneity bias | Autumn Topic 1, p114-123 | |
| 2021 Q1 Divorce and income | c | bias sign intuition | 用 covariance/signs 判断 OLS bias 方向,解释 reverse causality | Autumn Topic 1, p114-123 | |
| 2021 Q1 Divorce and income | d | first-born girl as IV | 写 first stage, exclusion, independence;用于 divorce 对 income 的 causal effect | Autumn Topic 1, p124-133 | |
| 2021 Q1 Divorce and income | e | heterogeneous IV model | 需要说服 monotonicity, first-stage heterogeneity, no defiers, exclusion with heterogeneous effects | Autumn Topic 1, p134-149 | |
| 2021 Q1 Divorce and income | f | LATE limitations | 说明 IV identifies compliers not ATE/ATT;可用 multiple instruments, external validity discussion, heterogeneity analysis | Autumn Topic 1, p144-152 | |
| 2021 Q2 UBI | a | UBI vs income floor and labor supply | 画 budget constraints;分 initial hours and participation;UBI income effect vs income floor kink/notch | Autumn Topic 1, p62-72 | |
| 2021 Q2 UBI | b | evidence for quantitative UBI effects | 引 lottery wealth effects, NIT/transfer evidence, SSP caution;强调 external validity and financing | Autumn Topic 1, p24-45; Autumn Topic 1, p67-87 | |
| 2021 Q2 UBI | c | work-conditioned transfer | 比较 unconditional UBI and eligibility threshold;讨论 extensive margin, bunching at 10 hours, inequality | Autumn Topic 1, p65-72; Autumn Topic 1, p88-92 | |
| 2021 Q3 Crime scars | a | unemployment and crime participation | 用 legal opportunity cost/scarring logic;entry unemployment worsens legal labor market payoff | 未在当前 lecture PDFs 中找到 Becker crime 对应页;scarring 相关见 Lecture 9, p3-16 | |
| 2021 Q3 Crime scars | b | migration self-selection | local labor shocks may induce selective migration;selection changes treated population and biases local estimates | Autumn Topic 3, p47-59; Lecture 4 Update, p5-13 | |
| 2021 Q3 Crime scars | c | dynamic crime effects | 读 event-time pattern,区分 short-run and long-run scarring;联系 labor market scarring persistence | Lecture 9, p3-16; Lecture 9, p26-33 | |
| 2021 Q3 Crime scars | d | criminal record persistence | early convictions create path dependence, lower legal opportunities, higher reoffending | 未在当前 lecture PDFs 中找到 Becker crime 对应页;employment scarring 相关见 Lecture 9, p3-16 | |
| 2021 Q3 Crime scars | e | racial heterogeneity and discrimination | 预期 minorities experience larger labor-market shocks;不能直接把 heterogeneity 等同 discrimination,需要额外识别 | Lecture 2, p5-15; Lecture 2, p57-96; Lecture 9, p3-16 | |
| 2021 Q4 Cengiz minimum wage | a | missing/excess jobs | 读 wage-bin figure,比较 below-MW missing jobs and above-MW excess jobs;对照 perfect competition | Lecture 6, p21-34; Lecture 6, p84-91 | |
| 2021 Q4 Cengiz minimum wage | b | employment-wage elasticity | 用 percent employment effect divided by percent wage effect;解释 near-zero elasticity | Lecture 6, p21-34; Lecture 6, p86-91 | |
| 2021 Q4 Cengiz minimum wage | c | industry bite | restaurants/low-wage sectors have higher bite and stronger first stage | Lecture 6, p16-19; Lecture 6, p84-91 | |
| 2021 Q4 Cengiz minimum wage | d | small shocks and adjustment margins | 讨论价格、利润、productivity、firm value、reallocation, not only employment | Lecture 6, p79-104; Lecture 6, p108-120 | |
| 2021 Q4 Cengiz minimum wage | e | MW and long-run racial gaps | 区分 current earnings gap and persistent mobility; one-generation policy may not change rank-rank mobility | Lecture 6, p108-120; Lecture 8, p37-42; Lecture 8, p117-123; Lecture 2, p5-7 | |
| 2022 Q1 MTO | a(i) | treatment 1 vs treatment 2 | Restricted voucher vs unrestricted voucher ITT; interpret offer effect and take-up | Lecture 5, p37-43 | |
| 2022 Q1 MTO | a(ii) | treatment 1 vs control | Offer of low-poverty voucher vs no offer; not pure effect of moving itself | Lecture 5, p37-43 | |
| 2022 Q1 MTO | a(iii) | controls in randomized experiment | Controls improve precision/check balance; do not rescue identification | Lecture 5, p40-43 | |
| 2022 Q1 MTO | b | babies born after program | 警惕 endogenous fertility/post-treatment sample;建议预定义 cohorts/outcomes | Lecture 5, p37-50 | |
| 2022 Q1 MTO | c | many outcomes | 讨论 multiple testing, pre-analysis plan, outcome families, FWER | Lecture 5, p45-50; Autumn Topic 2, p113-118 | |
| 2022 Q1 MTO | d | voucher offer as IV | 写 first stage, exclusion, monotonicity, LATE for movers/compliers | Lecture 5, p37-43; Autumn Topic 1, p134-149 | |
| 2022 Q1 MTO | e | demolition quasi-experiment | 需要 demolition as-good-as-random, comparable controls, no selective mobility;比较 MTO ITT | Lecture 5, p52-67 | |
| 2022 Q2 Degree RD | a | linear RD assumptions | 说明 cutoff 附近 distinction recipients/nonrecipients comparable;linear CEF assumption | Autumn Topic 2, p74-85 | |
| 2022 Q2 Degree RD | b(i) | potential outcome CEFs | 写 E[Y0∣x] 和 E[Y1∣x] 的二阶多项式近似,允许 cutoff 两边形状不同 | Autumn Topic 2, p80-86 | |
| 2022 Q2 Degree RD | b(ii) | flexible estimating equation | 用 centered running variable and interactions with treatment for second-order polynomial | Autumn Topic 2, p80-86 | |
| 2022 Q2 Degree RD | b(iii) | advantage over linear RD | flexible CEF 减少非线性误判为 discontinuity 的风险 | Autumn Topic 2, p81-88 | |
| 2022 Q2 Degree RD | c | nonparametric RD | local linear RD around cutoff; identifies local treatment effect at cutoff | Autumn Topic 2, p86-88; Autumn Topic 2, p96-101 | |
| 2022 Q2 Degree RD | d | RD threats | manipulation/bunching and covariate imbalance; check density and predetermined covariates | Autumn Topic 2, p91-95; Autumn Topic 2, p123-124 | |
| 2022 Q3 Ban the Box | a | discrimination against ex-offenders | statistical discrimination: criminal record is productivity/risk signal;也可提 taste-based | Lecture 2, p57-67; Lecture 2, p71-96 | |
| 2022 Q3 Ban the Box | b | DiD assumptions | BTB timing across MSAs; need parallel trends by race, no differential shocks/no anticipation | Lecture 2, p93-96; Autumn Topic 2, p55-73 | |
| 2022 Q3 Ban the Box | c | interpreting Table 4 | compare White/Black/Hispanic effects for young low-educated males | Lecture 2, p93-96 | |
| 2022 Q3 Ban the Box | d | older/more educated placebo-style evidence | effects concentrated in groups employers use as proxy supports statistical not pure taste discrimination | Lecture 2, p71-96 | |
| 2022 Q3 Ban the Box | e | BTB and reoffending | lower employment opportunity can increase offending/reoffending incentives; connect policy backfire | Lecture 2, p93-96 | |
| 2022 Q4 Parental displacement | a | IGE beta | Define beta as intergenerational earnings elasticity; discuss lifetime income measurement | Lecture 8, p37-58 | |
| 2022 Q4 Parental displacement | b | causal effect of plant closure | Need plant closure conditionally exogenous; compare displaced vs non-displaced with controls/no pre-trends | Lecture 9, p3-8; Lecture 9, p30-33; Lecture 9, p55-59 | |
| 2022 Q4 Parental displacement | c | child outcomes | Interpret earnings, UI claims, social assistance effects as long-run spillovers | Lecture 9, p55-59; Lecture 8, p37-42 | |
| 2022 Q4 Parental displacement | d | Becker-Tomes channels | parental income shock lowers investment, changes neighborhood/school/stress | Lecture 8, p15-27; Lecture 9, p3-16 | |
| 2022 Q4 Parental displacement | e | persistence and scarring | persistent losses through employer/match capital and unemployment spells feed into children outcomes | Lecture 9, p3-16; Lecture 9, p26-44; Lecture 9, p55-59 | |
| 2023 Q1 Migration/Roy model | a | migration decision approximation | Same Borjas/Roy derivation as 2020 Q1a | Autumn Topic 3, p56-63 | |
| 2023 Q1 Migration/Roy model | b | counterfactual and realized migrant earnings | Use IMR selection terms for E[w0∣I=1] and E[w1∣I=1] | Autumn Topic 3, p64-68 | |
| 2023 Q1 Migration/Roy model | c | treatment effect of migration on migrants | Compare E[w1−w0∣I=1] to μ1−μ0; characterize selection terms and equality conditions | Autumn Topic 3, p67-75 | |
| 2023 Q1 Migration/Roy model | d | ideal migration experiment | Randomly assign migration opportunity/cost; discuss ethics, compliance, external validity, SUTVA/general equilibrium | Autumn Topic 3, p47-75 | |
| 2023 Q2 SSP | a | static labor supply prediction | Draw welfare vs SSP budget; use Slutsky and participation threshold; evaluate 0/15/30/45 hours | Autumn Topic 1, p7-23; Autumn Topic 1, p75-87 | |
| 2023 Q2 SSP | b | control group hours over time | Read table time pattern; describe baseline and trend in control group | Autumn Topic 1, p78-87 | |
| 2023 Q2 SSP | c | treatment group hours over time | Read treatment group trend and take-up/intensive/extensive margins | Autumn Topic 1, p78-87 | |
| 2023 Q2 SSP | d | program effects over time | Compare adjusted/unadjusted differences; discuss take-up, job search, eligibility, dynamic response | Autumn Topic 1, p78-87 | |
| 2023 Q2 SSP | e | static model vs observed evidence | Explain static model predicts incentives but not gradual take-up/time dynamics | Autumn Topic 1, p75-87 | |
| 2023 Q3 MW and racial inequality | a | coverage, bite, racial pay gaps | Newly covered industries have higher Black share, creating stronger treatment intensity | Lecture 6, p16-19; Lecture 6, p108-121; Lecture 2, p5-7 | |
| 2023 Q3 MW and racial inequality | b | DiD assumptions | Treatment newly covered industries, control already covered; need parallel trends by race | Lecture 6, p54-58; Lecture 6, p86-90; Autumn Topic 2, p55-73 | |
| 2023 Q3 MW and racial inequality | c | wage effects by race | Positive earnings effects; larger Black effect follows exposure/bite | Lecture 6, p115-120; Lecture 6, p108-121; Lecture 2, p5-7 | |
| 2023 Q3 MW and racial inequality | d | employment effects | Compare perfect competition job-loss prediction to small/zero modern employment effects | Lecture 6, p21-34; Lecture 6, p84-104 | |
| 2023 Q3 MW and racial inequality | e | historical racial gap decline | MW compressed lower tail and high-exposure Black industries; later reforms may have less racial exposure | Lecture 6, p108-121; Lecture 6, p115-120; Lecture 2, p5-7; Lecture 2, p57-67 | |
| 2023 Q4 Trade and crime | a | import competition and local labor markets | Explain tariff reductions by regional industrial exposure affect earnings/employment | Lecture 4 Update, p9-13; Autumn Topic 4, p83-93 | |
| 2023 Q4 Trade and crime | b | DiD assumptions and labor-market results | Need regional exposure as-good-as-random conditional on controls; interpret earnings/employment panels | Autumn Topic 2, p55-73; Lecture 4 Update, p9-13 | |
| 2023 Q4 Trade and crime | c | labor-market effects in Becker crime model | Lower legal earnings/employment reduce opportunity cost of crime; Becker crime model itself not in lecture deck | 未在当前 lecture PDFs 中找到 Becker crime 对应页;labor shock context Lecture 9, p3-16 | |
| 2023 Q4 Trade and crime | d | reduced-form crime estimates | Interpret RTC coefficient signs relative to predicted crime changes and policy exposure scale | 未在当前 lecture PDFs 中找到 Becker crime 对应页;local shocks context Lecture 4 Update, p9-13 | |
| 2023 Q4 Trade and crime | e | IV exclusion problem | Trade shock affects crime through public goods, revenue, inequality, migration, not only labor market outcomes | Autumn Topic 1, p124-149; Lecture 4 Update, p9-18 | |
| 2024 Q1 Slutsky and lottery | a | wage decrease via Slutsky | Use Marshallian vs Hicksian leisure demand; translate leisure response into labor supply | Autumn Topic 1, p16-23 | |
| 2024 Q1 Slutsky and lottery | b | unambiguous wage increase effect | State cases where substitution and income effects imply same direction, e.g. inferior leisure or dominated income effect | Autumn Topic 1, p20-23 | |
| 2024 Q1 Slutsky and lottery | c | Imbens lottery figure | Discuss preexisting differences, timing, magnitude, volatility, and relation to income effect | Autumn Topic 1, p24-29 | |
| 2024 Q1 Slutsky and lottery | d | Swedish lottery identification | Explain lottery-cell randomization, controls, randomization tests, difference from Imbens et al. | Autumn Topic 1, p30-39 | |
| 2024 Q1 Slutsky and lottery | e | decompose earnings into hours and wages | Distinguish labor-supply hours response from wage/job-quality response | Autumn Topic 1, p39-45 | |
| 2024 Q2 CES skill premium | a | derive skill premium and elasticity | Use marginal products under CES; derive wH/wL and elasticity wrt AH/AL | Autumn Topic 4, p57-67 | |
| 2024 Q2 CES skill premium | b | aggregate time-series estimation | Estimate log skill premium on log relative supply and demand trend; discuss identification and endogeneity | Autumn Topic 4, p68-79 | |
| 2024 Q2 CES skill premium | c | firm-panel estimation | Use firm variation in technology/skill mix; discuss sorting, simultaneity, demand shocks | Autumn Topic 4, p75-90 | |
| 2024 Q2 CES skill premium | d | low-skilled wage decline | Explain possible skill-biased tech with relative demand shifts; assess plausibility | Autumn Topic 4, p65-79; Autumn Topic 4, p83-93 | |
| 2024 Q3 Upward mobility | a(i) | gender/race mobility differences | Read figure through gender/racial gaps and pre-market/post-market mechanisms | Lecture 1, p7-25; Lecture 2, p5-15; Lecture 8, p117-123 | |
| 2024 Q3 Upward mobility | a(ii) | geography in mobility | Use Chetty-style geography and neighborhood opportunity | Lecture 8, p117-123; Lecture 5, p37-50 | |
| 2024 Q3 Upward mobility | b | school quality in Becker model | School quality changes return/cost/productivity of parental investment | Lecture 8, p15-27; Lecture 8, p110-114 | |
| 2024 Q3 Upward mobility | c(i) | border-pair model and Dube analogy | Cross-border pairs absorb local shocks while policy variation differs | Lecture 6, p67-78; Lecture 8, p117-123 | |
| 2024 Q3 Upward mobility | c(ii) | why border pairs help | Within-pair differencing removes shared geography; remaining concern state-specific shocks | Lecture 6, p67-78; Lecture 8, p117-123 | |
| 2024 Q3 Upward mobility | d | mandated teacher wages as IV | Discuss relevance, exclusion, first stage, 2SLS vs OLS | Lecture 6, p21-34; Lecture 6, p67-78; Lecture 8, p110-114 | |
| 2024 Q3 Upward mobility | e | employment margin critique | Mandated wage may affect teacher employment/quality/composition, threatening exclusion | Lecture 6, p21-34; Lecture 6, p79-104 | |
| 2024 Q4 Racial bias in policing | a | manipulation around threshold | Use bunching/density logic near 9/10 mph to classify lenient officers | Autumn Topic 2, p91-95; Lecture 2, p57-92 | |
| 2024 Q4 Racial bias in policing | b(i) | Price-Wolfers similarity | Compare decision-maker assignment and same/different race treatment interaction | Lecture 2, p38-52; Lecture 2, p57-67 | |
| 2024 Q4 Racial bias in policing | b(ii) | assignment assumption | Need quasi-random encounter with lenient officer conditional on controls | Lecture 2, p38-52; Lecture 2, p57-67 | |
| 2024 Q4 Racial bias in policing | b(iii) | testing assignment assumption | Covariate balance: driver characteristics should not predict officer leniency | Lecture 2, p38-52; Lecture 2, p57-67 | |
| 2024 Q4 Racial bias in policing | c | beta3 interpretation | beta3 shows whether white drivers receive more leniency discount than minority drivers | Lecture 2, p57-92 | |
| 2024 Q4 Racial bias in policing | d(i) | taste vs statistical discrimination | Define prejudice/taste versus Bayesian group signal under imperfect information | Lecture 2, p57-67; Lecture 2, p71-86 | |
| 2024 Q4 Racial bias in policing | d(ii) | prior tickets and statistical discrimination | If prior tickets proxy criminality, residual race gap is less consistent with statistical discrimination on that signal | Lecture 2, p71-92 | |
| 2025 Q1 Occupational decline | a | data for long-run worker effects | Use linked admin/panel earnings and occupation data with pre-period occupation and controls | Lecture 9, p3-8; Lecture 9, p28-33 | |
| 2025 Q1 Occupational decline | b | causal assumptions | Conditional exchangeability/parallel trends between declining and non-declining occupations | Lecture 9, p30-33 | |
| 2025 Q1 Occupational decline | c | testing assumptions | Pre-trends, placebo outcomes, pre-period balance, robustness to control groups | Lecture 9, p30-33 | |
| 2025 Q1 Occupational decline | d | decomposition | Interpret treatment effect for A, treatment effect for B, and baseline occupation differences | Lecture 9, p28-44 | |
| 2025 Q1 Occupational decline | e | regression interpretation | State assumptions for beta to summarize causal occupational-decline loss | Lecture 9, p28-44 | |
| 2025 Q2 UBI | a | UBI vs income floor | Draw budget constraints and compare participation/hours by initial-hours scenario | Autumn Topic 1, p62-72 | |
| 2025 Q2 UBI | b | quantitative UBI evidence | Use lottery/NIT/SSP evidence with caution about external validity and financing | Autumn Topic 1, p24-45; Autumn Topic 1, p67-87 | |
| 2025 Q2 UBI | c | work-conditioned UBI | Analyze 10-hour eligibility threshold, participation incentives, bunching, inequality | Autumn Topic 1, p65-72; Autumn Topic 1, p88-92 | |
| 2025 Q3 Rosen-Roback | a | worker problem and FOCs | Set utility over composite good, land, amenity; FOC equates MRS to rent/price | Lecture 4 Update, p23-26; Lecture 4 Update, p30-32 | |
| 2025 Q3 Rosen-Roback | b | indirect utility and worker equilibrium | Derive V(w,r,s); mobile workers require equalized utility | Lecture 4 Update, p43-45; Lecture 4 Update, p59-63 | |
| 2025 Q3 Rosen-Roback | c | firm unit cost and equilibrium | Derive c(w,r,s) and zero-profit/free-entry condition c=1 | Lecture 4 Update, p27-29; Lecture 4 Update, p64-75 | |
| 2025 Q3 Rosen-Roback | d(i) | regulation cost shock | Treat zero-emission machinery as negative productivity/cost shock; sign wages/rents through equilibrium conditions | Lecture 4 Update, p47-58; Lecture 4 Update, p64-75 | |
| 2025 Q3 Rosen-Roback | d(ii) | firm lump-sum transfer | Distinguish lump-sum transfer from marginal productivity/amenity change; discuss capitalization | Lecture 4 Update, p47-58; Lecture 4 Update, p64-75 | |
| 2025 Q3 Rosen-Roback | e | empirical amenity valuation | Estimate capitalization into wages/rents; specify data, identifying variation, welfare formula | Lecture 4 Update, p59-75 | |
| 2025 Q3 Rosen-Roback | f | policy recommendation | Recommend policies only if amenity/productivity gains exceed costs and target groups retain welfare | Lecture 4 Update, p16-18; Lecture 4 Update, p76-77; Lecture 5, p9-22 | |
| 2025 Q4 Statistical discrimination | a | statistical discrimination model | Write productivity prior by group, noisy signal, Bayesian updating | Lecture 2, p71-86 | |
| 2025 Q4 Statistical discrimination | b | employer learning test | Use experience interactions; group/schooling proxy weights should change as employers learn | Lecture 2, p90-92 | |
| 2025 Q4 Statistical discrimination | c | cautions | Omitted ability, schooling as proxy, selection, experience profile differences, what firms observe | Lecture 2, p21-36; Lecture 2, p90-92 | |
| 2025 Q4 Statistical discrimination | d | ability proxy z | Estimate Altonji-Pierret style model with ability proxy and experience interactions | Lecture 2, p90-92 | |
| 2025 Q4 Statistical discrimination | e | policy recommendation | Improve individual information signals/certification/auditing; warn removing information can backfire | Lecture 2, p93-101 | |